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Abstract 
The United States Army’s reserve component has transformed from a strategic force to a 
fully operational organization as the military efforts in the Global War on Terrorism have 
escalated. This transition came with significant costs and is particularly unsustainable as 
deployment opportunities continue to decline. This capstone provides historical context 
to this problem while quantitatively and qualitatively evaluating a proposal that would re-
focus the Reserve’s mission in an attempt to perpetually retain the present heightened 
level of readiness. 
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
FROM: Steven Davidson 
SUBJECT: Retaining the U.S. Army’s Reserve Component as an Operational Force 
DATE: December 10, 2017 
________________________________________________________________________ 
ACTION FORCING EVENT 
The RAND Corporation published a study on June 12, 2017 titled, “Sustaining the 
Army’s Reserve Components as an Operational Force”.1 This report outlined the Army’s 
extensive utilization of the Reserve Component throughout the Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT) and asserted that maintaining the current level of capacity will require deliber-
ate action by the Department of Defense (DOD).2 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 The substantial use of the Army’s reserve component (RC) at the onset of the 
GWOT resulted in the deployment of forces who were generally unprepared for the aug-
mented role they would play in the war effort.3 This precipitated a high RC casualty rate 
and a reduced level of readiness across the enterprise, as attempts to rectify equipment 
                                                 
1 Schnaubelt, Christopher, Raphael S. Cohen, Molly Dunigan, Gian Gentile, Jaime L. Hastings, 
Joshua Klimas, Jeff Marquis, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Bonnie Triezenberg and Michelle Darrah Ziegler. 
Sustaining the Army's Reserve Components as an Operational Force. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corpora-
tion, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1495.html. 
2 Ibid., iii. 
3 "Death Toll Rises for Military Reservists." Military.com. October 11, 2005. Accessed September 
15, 2017. http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,78441,00.html.;Smith, R. Jeffrey. "U.S. Military 
Admits Major Mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan." The Atlantic. June 11, 2012. Accessed September 15, 
2017. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/us-military-admits-major-mistakes-in-
iraq-and-afghanistan/258339/.; Graham, Bradley. "National Guard Seeks $20 Billion Over 3 Years for 
Arms, Gear." The Washington Post. December 17, 2004. Accessed September 15, 2017. http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5972-2004Dec16.html.; Gold, Scott. "Guardsmen Say They're Facing 




and personnel shortfalls left non-mobilized units incapacitated.4 Although improvements 
were made over the duration of the conflict, they were done through “muscle memory” 
and reactionary policies that attempted to solve immediate tactical problems with little at-
tention to their broader strategic implications. As a result, there is no set plan to maintain 
this heightened level of capacity during peacetime and a myriad of policies sustaining the 
RC as an operational force during war.5 Failing to maintain the current level of capacity 
risks the recurrence of the problems seen at the initiation of the GWOT.  
The aftermath of Al-Qaeda's September 11, 2001 attacks saw the beginning of 
GWOT and the commencement of two major conflicts.6 The first, Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF), would be principally conducted in Afghanistan while the latter, Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom (OIF), would occur solely within Iraq. In the first four years of 
GWOT, the RC would deploy 155,627 personnel, amounting to 35% of the Army’s total 
deployments.7 By 2005, the fifth year of GWOT, and the second of OIF, the RC would 
account for 43% of the total casualties incurred by the Army.8 
 
                                                 
4Skelton. "Mortgaging the Future of the Military." Congressional Record, Volume 152 Issue 87 
(Thursday, June 29, 2006). June 26, 2006. Accessed September 15, 2017. 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2006-06-29/html/CREC-2006-06-29-pt2-PgH4911.htm. 
5 United States. Congress. House. Second report to Congress by the Commission on the National 
Guard and Reserves. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2008. 10. 
6"Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation." The Washington Post. September 20, 2001. Ac-
cessed September 15, 2017. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/tran-
scripts/bushaddress_092001.html. 
7Powers, Rod. "Deployment rates Iraq and Afghanistan." The Balance. Accessed September 15, 
2017. https://www.thebalance.com/deployment-rates-3356917. 
8Ozcan, Sezgin. Casualty Profile of the United States Army in Afghanistan and Iraq. Master's the-
sis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2012.  
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Figure 1: Breakdown of U.S. Army Casualties, 2003-2005 
Data Accessed From: Ozcan, Sezgin. Casualty Profile of the 
United Stated Army in Afghanistan and Iraq. Master's thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. Monterey: Naval Postgrad-
uate School, 2012. ; United States. Department of Defense. 
Defense Manpower Data Center. Operations Iraqi Freedom 
Monthly Casualty Report, 2017. ; United States. Department 
of Defense. Defense Manpower Data Center. Operations En-
during Freedom Monthly Casualty Report, 2017. 
 
This data becomes particularly compelling when balanced with the knowledge that the 
RC possesses a preponderance of personnel whose roles would typically place them out 
of range of daily engagement with the enemy. While the RC does comprise, “55% of the 
Army’s combat forces,” it is primarily a support organization with, “63% of the Army’s 
combat support units and 68% of its combat service support units.”9 Additionally, even 
though there are direct combat forces in the RC, they were not intended, “to deploy in the 





                                                 
9Hargreaves, Robert. An Army "Reserve Components Transformation" Strategy for the 21st Cen-
tury. Master's thesis, Army War College , 2001. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2001. 
10 Reserve forces: Army National Guard’s Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reex-
amined. GAO-06-170T. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office. 9. 
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Figure 2: Reserve Component Force Deployments 
Source: Bonds, Tim, Dave Baiocchi, and Laurie L. McDonald. 
Army deployments to OIF and OEF. Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Arroyo Center, 2010. 
 
 The high deployment of RC forces early in OIF exacerbated supply, logistical, 
and personnel problems already present in reserve units. For years, the DOD successfully 
employed a tiered resourcing strategy that placed an emphasis on AD forces. Under this 
program RC units would, “maintain fewer personnel and less equipment than they would 
need in the event of a deployment [and would] train at lower states of readiness with the 
expectation that there would be sufficient time to add the required personnel and equip-
ment prior to a deployment.”11 As a result of this program, RC units were only manned 
                                                 
11 Reserve forces: An Integrated Plan is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel and Equip-
ment Shortages: Report to Congressional Committees. GAO-05-660. Washington, D.C.: Government Ac-
countability Office, 2005. 10. 
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and equipped at between 64% - 79% of their required deployment capacity.12 With DOD 
requirements mandating that mobilized units, “must generally have at least 80 percent of 
[their] mission-essential equipment on hand”, the RC began extensively transferring 
items from non-mobilized units to their mobilized counterparts.13 By June 2005, the 
Army National Guard (one of the two subsets within the Army’s reserve component) had 
transferred, “more than 101,000 pieces of equipment,” to mobilized units for use over-
seas.14 During that same period, the United States Army Reserve (the second of the two 
subsets within the Army’s reserve component) stated that 45% of their deployed person-
nel had been transferred from non-mobilized units.15 These actions greatly reduced readi-
ness as domestically located units lacked personnel to conduct training and possessed, 
“only about 34[%] of their essential warfighting equipment.”16 
 While the RC did eventually rectify these problems, producing a force capable of 
providing genuine strategic depth, it did so in a particularly unsustainable manner. More 
specifically, the primary issue preventing the continuation of the policies as they are, is 
budgetary.  
What created today’s reserve was first, the ability to train more frequently, and second, 
the acquisition of better equipment. Both of these factors will be adversely affected as de-
fense appropriations reduce in the post-war period.  
                                                 
12Reserve forces: Army National Guard’s Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reex-
amined. GAO-06-170T. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office.9. 
13 Ibid.,12. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Reserve forces: An Integrated Plan is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel and Equip-
ment Shortages: Report to Congressional Committees., 11. 
16 Reserve forces: Army National Guard’s Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reex-
amined. 11.; Schnaubelt, Christopher, Raphael S. Cohen, Molly Dunigan, Gian Gentile, Jaime L. Hastings, 




Figure 3: U.S. Military Spending 
Source: "Trends in U.S. Military Spending." Council on For-
eign Relations. Accessed September 18, 2017. 
https://www.cfr.org/report/trends-us-military-spending. 
 
 The first factor, training, is the biggest impediment to a unit’s readiness. As de-
ployments became more consistent, so too did available funding and training opportuni-
ties. Over the past 16 years, reservists were frequently able to work in AD environments 
which allowed for the development of a much more proficient organization.17 These 
training opportunities came largely in support of overseas operations, and as the demand 
for such practical experience declines so too will the justification for extensive exercises. 
Without finding fiscally prudent manners to continue RC training, reservists will be 
forced to return to the service schedule of purely 39 days per year in uniform. This, in 
turn, will decrease the number of qualified personnel available for immediate deployment 
while increasing the amount of time needed for pre-deployment training.18 
                                                 
17Sustaining the Army's Reserve Components as an Operational Force. 89. 
18 Cox, Matthew. "Army Plans to Double Training Days for Guard Units, Chief Says." Mili-
tary.com. December 15, 2015. Accessed September 15, 2017. 
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The second factor that aided in producing today’s highly operational reserve are 
the improvements in the quantity and quality of equipment. This, similarly to the previ-
ous factor, will be difficult to preserve in peacetime as it is mainly a product of funding. 
By 2014, the aforementioned supply problems had been rectified as the two subsets of the 
RC reported having 93% and 80% of their necessary equipment on hand.19 This came 
with a steep financial burden and as a result of sharp increases in the National Guard and 
Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) budget. At that time, these were easily de-
fensible as the need for equitable equipment became a politically charged issue in halls of 
Congress. Now, without a well-defined combat need, the argument for maintaining the 
NGREA budget at wartime levels is weakened. Without a clear reevaluation of the tiered 
resourcing model any unpredictable drop in funding will force the RC to return to an 
equipment model that will prohibit prompt deployment without disruptions to broader 
readiness. 
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
  
The Army’s Reserve Component (RC) is comprised of the United States Army 
Reserve (AR), who report solely to the President of the United States (POTUS), and the 
Army National Guard (ARNG), who report both to their respective state’s Governor and 
also to POTUS.20 Unlike their AD counterparts, reservists serve in a part-time capacity 
                                                 
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/12/14/army-plans-to-double-training-days-for-guard-units-chief-
says.html. 
19 Schnaubelt, Christopher, Raphael S. Cohen, Molly Dunigan, Gian Gentile, Jaime L. Hastings, 
Joshua Klimas, Jeff Marquis, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Bonnie Triezenberg and Michelle Darrah Ziegler. 
76.  
Army National Guard 93%, United States Army Reserves 80%. 
20"Understanding the Guard’s Duty Status." National Guard Association of the United States. Ac-
cessed September 15, 2017. Understanding the Guard’s Duty Status. 
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which historically had placed them on duty for only 39 days per year.21 The current force 
structure of the collective RC was created at a time when the US was still preparing for 
large-scale conventional war with the Soviet Union. Now, with burgeoning threats across 
the spectrum of warfare, the Army finds itself with 542,000 reservists who continue to 
operate within a structure that, “better represents [the Cold War] era than the present 
one.”22 
Over time, the RC has transformed. According to the official history of the AR, 
the 1990’s saw the conclusion of what had principally been a strategic reserve and the 
birth of what would become known as an operational reserve (OR).23 This new model, 
came out of necessity rather than vision, and places an emphasis on ensuring genuine in-
teroperability between the Army’s two components. Compared to a SR, an OR actively 
vies for usage in operations and maintains a higher level of readiness to ensure a shorter 
post-mobilization pre-deployment training period. 
 The modern day structure of the RC can trace its lineage to Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) Robert McNamara’s failed 1962 and 1964 attempts to consolidate the 
AR/ARNG into a single entity.24 Prior to this point, these two organizations were almost 
identical which provided the Army a congressionally protected redundancy that proved 
                                                 
21Klimas, Joshua, Thomas F. Lippiatt, Laurie L. McDonald and Jerry Sollinger. Paid Duty Days 
for Army Guardsmen and Reservists: A Comparison of Fiscal Year 2000 with Fiscal Years 2010 to 2013. 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1409.html. 
22Korb, Lawrence J. "Fixing the Mix: How to Update the Army’s Reserves." Foreign Affairs 83, 
no. 2 (2004): 2. doi:10.2307/20033897.; FY17 114-328, 114 Cong. (2016) (enacted). ; End strength: total 
Army is 1,022,000 with 480,000 to be located on Active Duty (AD), 343,000 to be within the Army Na-
tional Guard (ARNG), and the remaining 199,000 to belong to the United States Army Reserves (AR) 
23United States. Department of the Army. Office of the Army Reserve History. Army Reserve; A 
Concise History. Fort Bragg, NC: U.S Army, 2013. 
24United States. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. Historical Attempts to Reorgan-




difficult to overcome.25 Eventually, on December 1, 1967, the Secretary was successful 
in enacting the Army Reserve Realignment policy (ARRP) which tasked the AR with the 
roles of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) while allowing the 
ARNG to maintain both its combat and CS units.26  
Figure 4: Army Units By Classification 
Data Source: Pike, John. "Military Units." FM 3-90 Appendix 




 Six years later, the Pentagon would formalize the Total Force policy (TFP) with 
the objective of maintaining, “as small an active peacetime force as possible by placing 
greater reliance on reserve forces.”27 This action came at a particularly turbulent period in 
US military history as the nation transitioned from the draft to an all-volunteer force 
while also conducting a drawdown of American troops in Southeast Asia.28 With the TFP 
                                                 
25Ibid. 
26"McNamara's Impact on Defense Policies Weighed." In CQ Almanac 1967, 23rd ed., 07-971-07-
979. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1968. http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal67-
1313238. 
27 Schuster, Carol, and Charles Bonanno. "Reserves and Readiness: Appraising the Total Force 
Policy." The GAO Journal, no. 13 (January 1, 1991): 24. Accessed September 20, 2017. 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/200/195347.pdf. 
28United States. NCFA Operation Subcommittee. The Total Force Policy and Integration of Ac-
tive and Reserve Units. Washington, DC, 2015. 
 
10 
in mind, Army Chief of Staff, General Creighton Abrams produced the roundout strategy 
which eliminated one brigade in each AD division and assigned a comparable RC brigade 
to fill the void.29 This allowed Abrams to avoid end-strength contention while providing 
the nation a suitable deterrent force. As this strategy took effect problems arose regarding 
the level and quality of equipment being issued to RC roundout units.30 This led, in 1982, 
to the announcement of the first-to-fight policy (FTFP) which stated that, “units that fight 
first shall be equipped first, regardless of component.”31 While these policies brought the 
RC into the discussion as a viable and cost-efficient alternative to a large AD force, the 
roundout strategy and the FTFP made grave assumptions that became apparent as the US 
entered into Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm (ODS/S).  
On August 22, 1990, twenty days after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, President 
George H.W. Bush initiated a, “slow, rolling call-up” of reserve forces.32 Although re-
servists would serve valiantly throughout the conflict, the RC combat roundout brigades 
would not leave the US despite the deployment of their parent divisions.33 In fact, the uti-
lization of reserve units generally excluded combat forces in favor of CS/CSS units.34 
This decision was problematic for two reasons. First, failing to use the reserve roundout 
                                                 
29 Sullivan, Timothy. The Abrams Doctrine: Is it Viable and Enduring in the 21st Century?Mas-
ter's thesis, United States Army War College, 2005. Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2005. 3. 
30 Klimas, Joshua, Richard E. Darilek, Caroline Baxter, James Dryden, Thomas F. Lippiatt, Laurie 
L. McDonald, J Michael Polich, Jerry Sollinger and Stephen Watts. Assessing the Army's Active-Reserve 
Component Force Mix. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014. https://www.rand.org/pubs/re-
search_reports/RR417-1.html. 36. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid, 40. 
33Goldich, Robert. U.S. The Army's Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War. Rept. Wash-
ington, DC: Library of Congress, 1991.2. 
34 Peter Applebome, Special To The New York Times. "Guardsmen Return From War They Did-




brigades invalidated the system that had been elevating the status and proficiency of the 
reserves.35 Second, the FTFP had been financially favoring combat forces, which re-
mained stateside, as opposed to CS/CSS units that were among the first to be deployed.36 
These issues placed a practical backdrop on the policies of the past three decades and 
forced the reconsideration of the RC’s place in the military strategy of the US.37 
In December 1990, with the offensive actions of ODS/S about to commence, 
DOD recommended that in the future AD forces should plan to, “be able to deploy rap-
idly to trouble spots and to sustain themselves with virtually no support from the [RC].”38 
This announcement was followed by series of reviews which proposed and enacted re-
ductions in reserve manpower.39 Principal among the post-ODS/S policies that affected 
the RC was the 1993 Offsite Agreement.40 This guidance affirmed the force structure out-
lined in the ARRP and declared that while reserve units would still be associated with 
AD divisions, it was solely for training purposes and that they should expect to deploy 
only as reinforcements and not until 90 days after the start of a conflict.41 This was a de-
parture from the closely linked, and mutually deployable, AD/RC divisions planned for 
                                                 
35 Klimas et al. 40. 
36 Schuster, Carol, and Charles Bonanno. 6. 
37 United States. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. Historical Attempts to Reorgan-




40 Office of the Assistant Secretary . Department of Defense. "Army Guard and Reserve Restruc-






with the TFP. It is also all but a formal relegation of the reserves from what was once be-
coming an operational organization to a strategic, but alert institution.  
Eight years later, in 2001 the US would initiate what would truly become a global 
war on terrorism. The relevance of GWOT to the Army’s RC is tremendous as nothing 
has had a greater influence on the present force than this extended military action. As 
preparations for the invasion of Iraq commenced, defense planners began assigning inter-
national missions previously conducted by AD troops to RC responsibility. In 2002, the 
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo transitioned to reserve control.42 While 
there might have been initial questions surrounding the performance and professionalism 
of reserve peacekeepers, these concerns were quelled as the civilian leadership in each 
area reported a negligible difference.43 The RC’s ability to successfully conduct opera-
tions independent of AD forces demonstrated that they could, in fact, “function effec-
tively in national-level operational roles.”44 
 By 2005, the RC was being heavily used throughout the GWOT. This, as dis-
cussed in the previous section, resulted in serious readiness and equipment problems. 
Recognizing the need to improve the responsiveness of their force, the RC altered their 
training paradigm of alert-mobilize-train to train-alert-deploy.45 This seemingly minor 
                                                 
42Greenhill, Jim. "Multinational Force Observers." National Guard. 2011. Accessed September 
15, 2017. http://www.nationalguard.mil/Features/2011/Multinational-Force-Observers/.;Beardsley, Steven. 
"Active Duty US Troops to do Kosovo Peacekeeping." Military.com. Accessed October 02, 2017. 
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/03/14/active-duty-us-troops-to-do-kosovo-peacekeeping.html. 
43 Ibid. 
44Felhazi, Sandor. "A thumbnail sketch of a “live” peace operation: The Ohio National Guard in 
Kosovo." AARMS 8, no. 2 (2009). Accessed September 13, 2017. http://www.zmne.hu/aarms/docs/Vol-
ume8/Issue2/pdf/01felh.pdf. 
45Tillson, John. "Landpower and the Reserve Components." Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 36 
(2004). Accessed September 10, 2017. doi:10.18411/d-2016-154. 
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change radically transformed the mindset of the force and effectively ended the expecta-
tions of a somewhat relaxed, “one weekend a month” of service. As the Army worked to 
improve readiness, the reserve’s equipment problems, already strained by overseas de-
ployments, became exacerbated by Hurricane Katrina. When the hurricane made landfall 
in August 2005, the National Guards of Louisiana and Mississippi lacked the required 
equipment to immediately respond to the disaster.46 Realizing that this problem was not 
isolated to coastal states, Congress substantially increased the NGREA to ensure the RC 
was appropriately resourced for both its overseas and domestic missions.  
 
 
Figure 5: National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations 
Data Accessed From: "National Guard and Reserve Equip-
ment Appropriation (NGREA) ." AcQuipedia. August 8, 2016. 
Accessed September 14, 2017. OSD’s ASD(R) (Readiness 
Programming and Resources) 
                                                 
46 Reserve forces: Army National Guard’s Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reex-




As equipment shortages were being resolved, the Army enacted two policies 
aimed at adding a degree of predictability to reserve usage. First, in 2005, the Army 
Force Generation process (ARFORGEN) announced that, “units would be manned, 
equipped, and trained based on where they were in a three-phase cyclical deployment 
model.”47 Unlike the previous model which resourced units according to their likelihood 
of deploying first, this strategy assumed that units were always somewhere along the, 
training to deploy, ready to deploy, and deploying spectrum.48 The second major adjust-
ment came in 2007 with the announcement that mobilized reservists would remain on AD 
for no longer than one year; at which point, they would then become ineligible for invol-
untary redeployment for the next five years.49 Despite giving RC commanders a better 
awareness of when their organizations would be utilized, the Army had still not commit-
ted itself to a long-term plan for the future of the reserves.50  
 One year later, in 2008, the DOD published a directive titled, “Managing the Re-
serves as an Operational Force”.51 This initially affirms that the RC is an integrated part 
of the total force and then commits an inordinate amount of the document asserting that 
                                                 
47 Schnaubelt et al. 34. 
48 Schnaubelt et al. 35. 
49 United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary. Utilization of the total force: 
memorandum for secretaries of the military departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Sec-
retaries of Defense. By Robert Michael Gates. Washington, D.C.: Secretary of Defense, 2007. 
50 "ARFORGEN: Army's deployment cycle aims for predictability." Www.army.mil. Accessed 
October 02, 2017. https://www.army.mil/article/30668/arforgen_armys_deployment_cycle_aims_for_pre-
dictability. 
51 United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary. Managing the Reserve Compo-
nents as an Operational Force. Series 1200.17. Arlington, VA, 2008. 
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the, “Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities are total force mis-
sions.”52 This was one of the first policies that enumerated the RC as an operational or-
ganization but even in doing so it focused on its importance in domestic missions. This 
seems to indicate that present conditions aside, the intention is to maintain the force as a 
general reserve with the same mission it had historically been assigned.  
The Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) published in 2012 stressed that unconven-
tional military operations will remain prevalent throughout the 21st century. It further 
stated that the, “expected pace of operations over the next decade will be a significant 
driver in determining an appropriate A[D]/RC mix and level of RC readiness.”53 Over the 
next five years, the opportunities for deployment declined substantially as the US would 
only position approximately 20,000 troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan.54 Halfway 
through the decade that was intended to determine the force’s future, there remains little 
expectations of spikes in demand. As such, reserve leaders have begun extensive advo-
cacy campaigns as they attempt to prevent a return to the pre-GWOT force. 
The changes made throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s elevated the RC to a status 
that placed it prominently within national security discussions as an organization capable 
of providing genuine interoperability. With these changes taking hold, the US entered 
into a conflict where it employed reserve forces in a manner that failed to validate their 
developing capabilities. Defense planners then reinforced a thirty year old structure while 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53Panetta, Leon E., and Barack Obama. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st 
Century Defense. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2012. 7.  
54Bialik, Kristen. "U.S. active-duty military presence overseas is at its smallest in decades." Pew 




also immediately altering the core components of the TFP in a manner completely coun-
ter to its original intent.55 These latter changes were promptly ignored as the Army uti-
lized a significant number of RC troops at the outbreak of OIF. As usage remained high 
in the early years of GWOT, reserve commanders and defense policymakers built a force 
truly capable of what had been intended in the late 20th century. Despite these improve-
ments, the DOD has abstained from definitively solidifying the future of the RC by con-
tinuing to state that their readiness will be determined by demand. 
 The policies that developed the present day force were created from a cold war 
framework and in response to the on-the-ground needs of commanders serving through-
out GWOT. Their sustainability without continued deployment requirements seems un-
likely. As such, the ARNG continues to prepare primarily for conventional conflict and 
domestic emergencies while the AR remains focused on “theater level sustainment” re-
sponsibilities.56 These assignments are relics of an era preparing for state-on-state con-
flict and a national security strategy where the US military needed to be, “capable of 
fighting and winning two major theater wars nearly simultaneously.”57 Having demon-
strated their capacity throughout the GWOT, public perception indicates a desire to retain 
an OR versus returning to a SR.58 Nonetheless, the low demand for reserve personnel, the 
                                                 
55 Office of the Assistant Secretary . Department of Defense. "Army Guard and Reserve Restruc-
turing Planned." News release, December 10, 1993. Accessed September 22, 2017. 1. ; U.S Army, Center 
of Military History, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (chapter 8, 
“Structuring the Force: The Army and Total Force Policy”), 104, http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/DAH 
SUM/1990-91/ch08.htm. 
56"Home Page, About ." U.S. Army Reserve. Accessed October 1, 2017. 
http://www.usar.army.mil/About-Us/. 
57Cohen, William S. The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of 
Defense, 1997. 
58Stiegel, Brad. "Maintaining the Operational Reserve." January 16, 2016. http://smallwarsjour-
nal.com/jrnl/art/maintaining-the-operational-reserve.;"Preserve an Operational Force. National Guard Asso-




lack of definitive guidance from DOD, and the potential for deep budgetary cuts necessi-
tates the need to radically rethink the role of the reserves.  
POLICY PROPOSAL 
The goal of this proposal is to retain an operational reserve (OR) in a manner that 
is both conscious of the global security environment and sustainable within domestic fis-
cal constraints. The objective of this policy is first, to provide the RC a focused mission 
that justifies a heightened level of readiness, and second, to create a force that is organi-
zationally structured to maintain capacity regardless of overseas troops demands. The 
first aspect of this proposal is to place operations other than war (peacekeeping, peace-
enforcement, disaster response, security sector assistance, humanitarian assistance, stabil-
ity, and reconstruction operations) under an umbrella formally referred to as unconven-
tional operations (UO); and formally assign the execution of these missions to the RC. 
The second aspect of this policy calls for the establishment of a targeted training method-
ology, that builds proficiency in UO while offering soldiers predictability in scheduling.  
This new training model, outlined in Figure 6, would utilize a three-phased indefi-
nitely cyclical system that covers a six year planning period. This framework would di-
vide the RC into six separate cohorts each accounting for approximately 16% of the total 
force. Deliberate care would be taken to ensure that each contingent contained a diverse 
set of organizational specialties and that no one grouping pulled all of its forces from a 
single state. Additionally, it is important to acknowledge that it would be units and their 
associated end strengths that would comprise a cohort, not individuals. It is for this rea-
son, that the cycle only accounts for approximately 96% of the force. The unaccounted 
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4% represent soldiers who are attending basic training, members of the delayed entry pro-
gram, pending service termination, or otherwise unavailable. The final caveat worth dis-
cussing is that this plan does not affect the ability for individual soldiers to conduct nec-
essary professional development training. These would be independent of the proposed 
model and would occur regardless of where a unit was located in the cycle.  
 
 




Figure 7: Yearly Progression through the Sustained Readiness Training Cycle 
 
The Sustained Readiness Training Model, Explained 
The Reset Phase 
 The first phase will last two years requiring units to train only 39 days annually. 
In this phase, reserve commanders will focus on ensuring that soldiers are medically and 
physically fit, that equipment is maintained and accounted for, and that basic require-
ments, like weapons qualifications, are completed satisfactorily. This could also be collo-
quially referred to as the base phase, due to the fact that the general requirements accom-
plished in these 39 days would be repeated every year of the training model. 
The Preparation Phase 
The second phase is three years in duration with a 60 day annual training require-
ment. In this phase, reserve commanders continue to use 39 of their allotted days to en-
sure soldier readiness while committing the additional 21 days to prepare their units for 
UO. Bearing in mind the, “crawl, walk, run” planning methodology, the first, or crawl, 
year of this phase will be primarily academic giving soldiers a general understanding of 
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UO. The second, or walk, year would continue to include academic training but would 
begin to include practical exercises. The third, or run year, would endeavor to build profi-
ciency through the use of extensive exercises capitalizing on the previously gained 
knowledge.  
The Ready Phase 
 The third phase lasts one year and requires 70 days of annual training. Similarly 
to the previous two phases, reserve commanders continue to utilize 39 days to verify 
basic readiness. The remaining 31 days are spent conducting thorough exercises in prepa-
ration for immediate deployment. Units within this phase will retain the highest level of 
readiness and will be prepared to deploy within 30 days of activation. If activated, the 
“ready” soldiers who are deployed will serve a standard nine month tour. With each co-
hort comprising over 86 thousand soldiers, it is unlikely that the entirety of a contingent 
will be used in a single deployment. Those who remain non-deployed will recycle to the 
“reset” phase as scheduled at the end of the year. The soldiers who did deploy will report 
back to their originally assigned group at the end of their tour. If forces are still required 
when this initial deployment ends, soldiers from the new “ready” cohort will deploy as 
replacements.  
Policy Authorization 
The changes can be put without the need for new legislation as they are broadly 
authorized by Title 10 §113 of the US Code (U.S.C.). This subsection grants the 
SECDEF the, “authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense.59 Title 
10 also requires the SECDEF to enumerate the present national security interests of the 
                                                 
5910 U.S.C.§ 113 (2016) 
 
21 
US, and to additionally outline the DOD’s plan to effectively assure these interests. This 
statutory requirement would allow for the inclusion of UO as a national security interest 
and would provide the legal basis for the RC’s subsequent mission adjustment. The sec-
ond aspect of this proposal, the updated training cycle, is authorized through Title 10 
U.S.C. § 3013. This enables the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY), “to conduct all af-
fairs of the Department of the Army”.60 Specifically, this subsection mandates that the 
SECARMY formulate, “policies and programs...fully consistent with national security 
objectives”.61 As the proposed training cycle is in support of the updated mission, it 
would be legally permissible. 
Policy Implementation 
The first step in accomplishing these changes is for the SECDEF to utilize the up-
coming national defense strategy to frame success in UO as a cornerstone to national se-
curity.62 Concurrent to this, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will add and define, 
“unconventional operations” within the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (proposed language below). 
Unconventional Operations- Activities conducted in an attempt to 
deter war, promote peace, or otherwise advance the national objectives of 
the United States. These missions include, but are not limited to, general 
peace operations, security sector assistance, civil military operations, for-
eign disaster relief, domestic emergencies, stability activities, and recon-
struction operations. See also civil affairs activities; peace building; peace 
enforcement; peacekeeping; and peacemaking. (JP 3-57, JP 3-07.3).63 
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After these two steps have been completed, the previously issued Department of Defense 
Directive (DODD) titled, “Managing the Reserve Component as an Operational Force” 
will be updated to include the term UO.64 This simple update will read, “c. Homeland 
Defense, Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA), and Unconventional Operations 
(UO) are total force missions.”65 The addition of UO in the DOD Dictionary, its inclusion 
in the nation defense strategy, and its mention within a DODD provides the policy frame-
work for the mission adjustment to occur.  
 Following the previous actions, the implementation of the new training cycle will 
commence. The first step in this process is to inform Congress of the proposal. To this 
end, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Chief of the Army Reserves will 
present the new training plan to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Fol-
lowing the initial presentation of the plan, senior Army leaders will be expected to testify 
on the reasons for the new cycle, the planned roll-out process, and the efforts taken to 
minimize readiness disruptions. This congressional interaction depends on committee 
scheduling and should be expected to take a minimum of 6 months to complete.  
The second step, after Congressional notification has occurred, is to enact the 
training cycle through an initial six year pilot program. Unlike the actual cycle which in-
corporates 16% of the force in each group, the pilot will only comprise a single brigade 
(approximately 3,000 soldiers) per cohort. The first brigade of the program will begin in 
the first year of the preparation (or second) phase. As they progress, they will be followed 
by a second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth brigade each respectively beginning in the first 
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year of the preparation phase. Although each brigade is initially bypassing the reset 
phase, this is a one time occurrence in order to immediately test the effectiveness of train-
ing units in phase 2 and phase 3. 
This pilot program, and the eventual complete conversion to the sustained readi-
ness training cycle, will be overseen by the Commander of U.S. Army Forces Command 
(FORSCOM). This command has historically conducted similar programs and is the cen-
tral authority for force changes.66 During the final year of the pilot program, the Depart-
ment of the Army will submit a report to Congress providing first, the lessons learned 
from the pilot, and second, the plan to transition the entirety of the RC into the cycle.  
After administratively dividing the RC into six separate groups, the first contin-
gent would begin at year one, phase one of the cycle. The remaining five groups would 
continue their training as normal, serving 39 days annually. The six original pilot bri-
gades would continue progressing throughout the cycle, only joining a cohort when the 
brigade’s individual timing aligned with year one phase one. At that point, the seasoned 
brigade would merge with the infant cohort providing reserve commanders with an expe-
rienced organization to fall back on during transitional problems. Gradually, assimilating 
the pilot brigades in this manner also continues to provide the Army with a deployable 
force in the third or “ready” phase. The total process from congressional notification to 
full execution would take approximately 13 years. 
POLICY ANALYSIS  
The Reserve Component's Mission Adjustment Toward Unconventional Operations  
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This portion of the policy is advantageous for several reasons. An initial benefit is 
that the updated mission would inevitably transform the reserve’s force structure which, 
at present, is better suited for the cold war than the 21st century.67 Additionally, allowing 
the RC to conduct UO frees the active Army to focus its attention solely on conventional 
conflict. This would provide the Army genuine strategic depth and a total force, fully 
trained and capable of executing any number of operations along the spectrum of warfare. 
This also gives the RC a deliberate purpose and capitalizes on its institutional uniqueness. 
Reservists, who spend a preponderance of their time in non-military environments, are 
specially equipped to bring, “maturity, life experience,[and] civilian-acquired skills to 
their military mission.”68 This depth of experience means that reservists are not only ca-
pable of conducting UO, as was seen in Bosnia and Kosovo, but that they might actually 
be the better suited component for missions whose success relies heavily upon interac-
tions with civilian populations.69  
These peacekeeping missions are not the sole indicator of successful reserve usage 
in UO. In fact, the Texas Army National Guard is presently being lauded as the gold 
standard for conducting security sector assistance (SSA) in Afghanistan.70 In this case, as 
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the mobilized unit learned their mission would center around training the Afghan Na-
tional Police force; they transferred personnel into their unit to ensure that the majority of 
their soldiers had either teaching, coaching, or previous law enforcement experience.71 
This example is the exception to what had been occurring in Afghanistan, as units tasked 
with SSA had generally lacked law enforcement background. This seemingly obvious 
oversight spawned an investigation by the Special Inspector General of Afghanistan Re-
construction (SIGAR). In the report following this study, SIGAR asserted that DOD 
needs to, “create specialized SSA units that are fully trained and ready to deploy rapidly 
for immediate SSA missions”.72 This undisputed demand-pull for units trained in SSA, 
the RC’s successful execution of previous peacekeeping operations and the ability to ap-
ply a wealth of civilian experience to their military roles all support the proposed mission 
adjustment. 
Alternatively, the mission change can be potentially problematic for the following 
reasons. The most pressing concern is that focusing 53% of the entire Army on UO risks 
deteriorating proficiency in conventional conflict which pose a more existential threat to 
the nation.73 The final issue worth mentioning is that the proposed mission adjustment is 
not simply an isolated edict. In fact, in order to prepare soldiers appropriately for these 
contingencies the Army would need to develop an entire education system surrounding 
                                                 
71Clardy, Christina. "Arrowhead Soldiers deploy to Afghanistan as trainers - Texas Military De-
partment." June 21, 2016. Accessed October 26, 2017. https://tmd.texas.gov/arrowhead-soldiers-deploy-to-
afghanistan-as-trainers. 
72United States. Special Inspector General of Afghanistan Reconstruction. Reconstructing the Af-
ghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan . 62nd ed. 
Vol. 17. LL. Alexandria, VA: SIGAR, 2017. 
73FY17 114-328, 114 Cong. (2016) (enacted). ; End strength: total Army is 1,022,000 with 
480,000 to be located on Active Duty (AD), 343,000 to be within the Army National Guard (ARNG), and 
the remaining 199,000 to belong to the United States Army Reserves (AR) 
 
26 
UO. This would be costly and time-consuming. While the initial trainings could be based 
around present field manuals, in order to build a transferable process for the broader RC a 
formal education system would need to be established.74 
The Sustained Readiness Training Model  
 The second portion of the policy, the sustained readiness training model, is advan-
tageous principally because it maintains tiered readiness. This, in and of itself, is a cost 
saving mechanism when compared to maintaining heightened readiness enterprise wide. 
It also shows no financial favor to units based on operational skill set, unlike the first to 
fight resourcing strategy of the 1980’s. The training day increases associated with the 
model (39, 60, and 70 days annually) are also in keeping with the Army’s Chief of Staff, 
General Miley’s, desire to increase RC training requirements in an attempt to ease the ap-
parent readiness problems.75 The SRTM, unlike General Miley’s statement, does not pro-
pose reservists serve 100 days per year which would be politically untenable as well as 
substantially more expensive. Further, any change to the reserve service structure brings 
with it a possible retention problem. When gauging reservists willingness to remain in 
service, a survey conducted by the author of this memorandum found that 79% would 
likely continue serving if there was a 60 day annual training requirement while only 58% 
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would likely remain if the change was to 100 days.76 This data indicates that while reten-
tion would certainly need to be addressed as a part of the policy implementation process, 
the risk for outright rejection of the policy at the individual soldier level is not as signifi-
cant as was originally believed. 
Figure 8: Likelihood of Remaining in Service if Training Requirement Increased  
Source: Davidson, Steven B. MS, A Quantitative Analysis of 
the Army's Reserve Component, Johns Hopkins University. 
 
 An additional advantage of the SRTM is that it does not requires significant re-
training as it incorporates two programs that are already instilled in the RC’s mentality. 
The first of these is the 1:5 service model which was discussed in the history and back-
ground section of this memorandum.77 Continuing this model grants reservists schedule 
predictability allowing them to better balance their civilian careers and family lives. Sec-
ond, the SRTM follows the “crawl, walk, run” training process which is an ingrained 
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methodology that the Army almost always employs for such changes.78 Lastly, the 
SRTM is estimated to cost approximately 7 billion dollars which is less than the present 
11 billion dollars allocated to the RC for manpower costs.79 This costs savings, while im-
portant, is the final advantage mentioned principally because it is a very approximate esti-
mate based on average costs per soldier per day of service provided to the author by the 
operations staff of a current Army Reserve brigade. However, even if the overall figure 
were to be two billion dollars short of the true costs, the savings afforded to the taxpayer 
would still be noteworthy.  
Conversely, the SRTM is problematic for several reasons. The largest drawback 
to this plan, is also the easiest to expound upon. Essentially, the Army could implement 
the SRTM and spend decades and billions of dollars on training soldiers for UO only to 
never actually utilize them for these operations. This reality aside, the more immediate 
issue facing the Army would be that expanding the training requirement for reservists is 
likely to cause the soldier undue hardship as they must adjust their civilian careers and 
balance their family life accordingly. In fact, the Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) states that employers, “are not obligated to re-
schedule [service-members] to make up the time lost [by military service]”.80 This means 
that it is possible that soldiers forced to take additional time off might lose financial com-
pensation. Additionally, as many reservists began civilian careers under the traditional 39 
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days per year of service, the added 29-31 days of military requirement might further 
strain the employer's ability to make accommodations for these absences. The increased 
time requirement would also adversely affect reservists educational pursuits.  
Figure 9: Army Education Levels by Component, 2014 
Data Accessed From: US. Department of Defense. Deputy As-
sistant Secretary of Defense (Military Community and Family 
Policy),. 2014 Demographics Profile of the Military Commu-
nity. 
 
While the RC possesses 53% of the total bachelor's degrees and 42% of advanced 
degrees of the total Army, the SRTM becomes problematic when considering the first 
two rows of Figure 8.81 Although quantitative data is lacking, qualitative interviews con-
ducted by the author found that a major concern amongst reserve commanders is that an-
nual time increases would adversely affect soldiers who are pursuing, but have not yet 
been awarded, their GED or bachelor's degrees.82 This becomes increasingly relevant 
when coupled with the knowledge that reservists receive substantially less education ben-
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efits than AD soldiers, forcing the majority of costs to be borne by the individual them-
selves.83 This means that increased schedule disruptions would precipitate class with-
drawal forcing the individual soldier to absorb any sunk costs. Lastly, while the afore-
mentioned polling indicated a favorable reaction to the time increase by soldiers, it is 
plausible that the respondents failed to truly grasp what that change entailed. Figure 9 de-
picts a potential SRTM schedule adjusted for minimal impacts on a traditional civilian 
work week (Monday to Friday). What is seen is that soldiers with full time jobs would 
work almost everyday of the week with only the occasional weekend off. Regardless of 
the initial willingness to remain in service, several cycles of the SRTM should be ex-












Figure 10: Sample Calendar of Annual Reserve Training 
                                                 





Collective Analysis  
The overall probability of success for the entirety of the proposal is high. The 
DOD possesses both the legal authority and the administrative capacity to implement the 
mission change and the SRTM. Combined, the plan provides the Army strategic depth 
while avoiding the replication of the problems seen at the onset of the GWOT. Specifi-
cally, this plan would ensure that the RC continued to maintain a heightened level of 
readiness at a cost, and in a manner, that is sustainable during an interwar period. It 
would also avoid the constant transfer problems that were prevalent in the opening years 
of OIF as the Army could simply pull forces from the cohort of the RC in the “ready” 
phase of the SRTM to deploy should a large-scale contingency occur. 
The biggest pitfall facing the proposal are the second and third order costs that 
would arise from the overall policy. First, there would be the need for developing the 
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training tools to effectively prepare the force for UO’s. Second, would be the need to off-
set the negative repercussions to soldier morale. This latter issue could likely be assuaged 
by providing increased civilian education benefits to reservists and through additional 
cash incentives for enlistment. As current appropriations for RC personnel stands at 11 
billion annually; with the SRTM estimated to cost 7 billion dollars annually the Army can 
not only implement the proposed plan but also provide funding for incentives while still 
falling under the present costs.84 
POLITICAL ANALYSIS 
Advocacy Organizations  
There are two reserve-centric advocacy organizations that would be vocal about the 
policy proposed in this memorandum. These include the National Guard Association of 
the United States (NGAUS) and the Reserve Officers Association (ROA).  
The NGAUS is an association whose primary focus is lobbying Congress on Na-
tional Guard issues.85 This organization would likely respond favorably to the proposal as 
it is generally in line with positions the group has previously taken. In fact, in 2015 the 
NGAUS circulated the results of a survey that was questioning the future of the force.86 
These findings, seen in Figure 10, asserted that the majority of respondents were support-
ive of both the RC remaining operational and increasing the amount of days reservists 
spent training.87 Although slightly general, this survey indicates two things. First, that the 
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NGAUS’ constituents would likely be open to the proposal, and second, that they too 
would be willing to consider any policy that retained the reserve’s heightened readiness.  
Figure 11: Survey Conducted by the NGAUS 
Source: Timmons, Mark. Can Do: Army leaders say some 
Guard units need to train more than 39 days a year. A new 
survey shows Guardsmen agree, December 2015, 26-27. 
 
The ROA, is a lobbyist organization that advocates for the RC in totality, not 
simply the National Guard or the Army Reserves.88 Unlike the NGAUS, less assumptions 
are needed with the ROA as they have formally expounded upon themes similar to the 
proposed plan.89 In 2015, the ROA’s president testified in front of the Senate Committee 
on Armed Services, where he stated that the RC’s future should focus on providing the 
Army surge capabilities instead of, “concentrating on large-maneuverability unit 
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skills.”90 He went on to outline the specific capabilities that he believed the RC was well-
equipped to provide which included post-conflict stability operations, homeland security, 
disaster response, and late stage humanitarian assistance.91 In fact, within his testimony, 
the only caveat continually identified was that while the RC possesses a force uniquely 
capable to conduct UO they, at present, cannot deploy fast enough to be the first on the 
ground.92 With this being the major concern of the ROA, it is easy to see how they would 
be optimistic about this memorandum's proposal, as this issue would be rectified through 
the implementation of the SRTM which deliberately increases the readiness and deploya-
bility of the reserves.  
A non-military advocacy organization that will likely have a mixed opinion of the 
proposal is the National Governors Association (NGA). The NGA, is a bipartisan associ-
ation who represents the interests of state governors in Washington D.C.93 This group 
could be expected to support the RC’s mission shift because it would ensure that the re-
serves abstained from returning to a strategic force; which the NGA has often spoken out 
against.94 While they would be supportive of the first half of this proposal, the NGA 
would likely be a vocal critic of the SRTM. This is because, as an organization, the NGA 
has a vested interest in advocating against federal overreach, which the SRTM could be 
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perceived as. It is possible that the NGA would view the inclusion of disaster response 
and the lack of specificity between the Army Reserves and the Army National Guard as a 
further erosion of the Governor’s power to command the forces within their borders.95 
The DOD could counter this perception through an awareness campaign to inform them 
that first, the separation between the National Guard and the Army Reserves will remain 
distinct, and second that, Governor’s would still maintain command and control of their 
forces during domestic disasters as long as they remained federally inactive. While the 
overall intent of the collective proposal is squarely in-line with the desires of the NGA, 
ROA, and the NGAUS; its implementation will certainly be contested.96 The key to polit-
ical success with these groups, is to communicate with them early in the process and to 
allow them to propose adjustments throughout the pilot program to mitigate their con-
cerns about the full roll-out.  
The United States Congress 
   In Congress, the major institutions that would be considering this proposal are the 
House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and the Senate Armed Services Committee 
(SASC). 
Representative Mac Thornberry, the Chairman of HASC, and Senator John McCain, the 
Chairman of SASC, are two individuals who would need to be consulted, won-over, and 
leveraged if this proposal is to have success. Fortunately, both members have previously 
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raised concerns about the military’s readiness problems and also spoken in support of re-
taining an operational reserve.97 In fact, Senator McCain recently took to the Senate floor 
to inform his counterparts that over the past three years, there have been 185 military 
training deaths and only 44 combat casualties.98 This is particularly telling about the 
problems with the present training paradigm and has been a common statistic highlighted 
by these two members of Congress who have been leading the charge in reforming the 
manner in which the military accounts for readiness.99 This reality greatly benefits the 
success of the proposal, as the SRTM’s incorporation of the “crawl, walk, run” methodol-
ogy gradually increases training while providing ample time to safely learn new skills be-
fore proceeding to the practical application of knowledge.  
 Although individual members would be lobbied by advocacy organizations to en-
sure that their state retained control of their respective National Guard troops, these fears 
could be assuaged by reassuring congress that the DOD would continue to respect state 
sovereignty. The overall policy would be favorably viewed by members of Congress be-
cause combined, the proposal solidifies the RC as an operational force while concurrently 
increasing the amount of time available for training. 
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The Premier Implementer, Secretary of Defense James Mattis 
The current SECDEF is the ideal leader to implement this change as he commands 
a great deal of respect from the military and within Congress. As a former member of the 
armed forces himself, SECDEF Mattis can present this plan not simply as a necessary 
policy shift, but as a vital change that would work to create the force of the future. This 
message would be more willingly received by the public as the SECDEF has a reputation 
of placing the interests of the military over present political opinions. In fact, in civilian-
based polls, SECDEF Mattis’ approval rating hovers around 40% placing him well atop 
his counterparts within the President’s Cabinet.100 In armed forces polling, this approval 
rating jumps to 89%, the highest in recent memory.101  
Collective Political Analysis  
 The political feasibility of the proposal is high, but the path to success is fraught 
with potential pitfalls. Despite the fact that the intent of the policy aligns with the desires 
of major advocacy organizations, there should be an expectation of contention throughout 
the rollout process. The communication and engagement previously discussed in this sec-
tion must be true, genuine, early, and often. This proposal must be taken to the ROA, 
NGAUS, and NGA’s leadership and pitched in a series of informational sessions early in 
the process. The DOD must be willing to genuinely listen to the concerns raised by these 
groups and must also take steps to rectify prevalent problems. Doing this will help secure 
their support for the program which is essential for its success. If these groups become 
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believers in the necessity of the plan, the DOD has then created invaluable ambassadors 
who will sway opinions in the military community and in Congress.  
While the overall proposal fits well within the DOD’s legal authorities, if Con-
gress is not consulted and supportive, the HASC and the SASC could indefinitely stall 
the proposal’s roll-out or even reduce personnel appropriations effectively killing the pol-
icy. In the politically charged environment that is President Trump’s administration, any 
major government reform should be expected to be challenged. In this regard, this policy 
has three advantages that make its success highly likely. First, is that the national security 
reputation of SECDEF Mattis is unparalleled, which will ease doubts cast on the policy’s 
validity. Second, is that the SRTM appears to be a reasonable compromise when com-
pared against the previously suggested 100 day annual requirement of reserve service.102 
Lastly, is that this proposal increases individual soldier proficiency in a safe and incre-
mental manner that is in keeping with the desires of Congress. 
RECOMMENDATION 
 My recommendation is for the SECDEF to implement the full proposal outlined 
in this memorandum. If enacted, the projected results of this policy would effectively es-
tablish a highly-capable force, strategically aligned and tactically prepared to meet the 
needs of the 21st century. When considering the first aspect of the two-fold proposal, I 
found that refocusing the RC’s mission easily justified the continuation of a heightened 
level of readiness. This policy also supplements rather than detracts from the Army’s 
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overall capabilities by freeing the active units to focus their attention on direct contact en-
gagements. Additionally, this decision will predicate the transformation of the RC’s force 
structure; taking what has been essentially a general insurance policy and infusing mis-
sion specificity that capitalizes on the institutional uniqueness of the organization itself. 
 When reflecting upon the second aspect of this proposal, I found that the SRTM 
builds holistic proficiency while concurrently mitigating the readiness problems seen at 
the onset of the GWOT. The SRTM’s targeted training methodology is the greatest asset 
of this entire proposal. On the whole, this structure safely and deliberately improves the 
capabilities of the RC while avoiding potential attrition problems by requiring only mar-
ginal increases to annual time commitment. Though seeming to be an inconsequential 
strategy, conducting training in this manner sustainably maintains a numerically signifi-
cant amount of personnel on immediately-deployable status. This greatly reduces the 
need to transfer troops between units in order to deploy, directly avoiding problems the 
Army has previously encountered. 
Politically, the biggest issue that this policy will encounter is its lack of distinction 
between the Army Reserves and the Army National Guard. This potentially grievous im-
pediment can, if managed carefully, be overcome through an awareness campaign that as-
sures these stakeholders that the National Guard will not only retain its state duties, but 
that it will also maintain its conventional capabilities. With an uncertain global security 
environment, the need for a well-rounded, proficient, and ready reserve is greater now 
than ever before. This is a point appreciated by the public and by their representatives in 
Congress, making this proposal’s political feasibility extremely high.  
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 The GWOT proved that the RC is a dedicated and adaptable organization which 
can overcome tremendous obstacles in order to accomplish their mission. In these tem-
pestuous times, the Army does not simply need a flexible RC, but one that is actively pre-
pared to surmount any number of peripheral military missions. If enacted, this proposal 
maintains the RC in a heightened state of readiness while concurrently making the Army 
a multi-dimensional fighting force capable of seamlessly addressing any contingent along 
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